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Abstract: More so now than ever, budgetary problems and widespread reforms are 
generating questions regarding higher education costs among publicly controlled 
compared to privately controlled colleges and universities.  Past studies have offered 
scale and scope estimates anchored in 1995 and earlier cross sectional data that could 
contain omitted variable biased.  In contrast, this paper employs panel data spanning 
the 2005 through 2009 years to estimate a multiproduct cost function and scale and 
scope economies separately for public and private sector colleges and universities. The 
two-way fixed effects results indicate the presence of significant institutional and time 
effects.  Overall, the findings suggest private institutions have the product specific cost 
advantage in expanding graduate and professional school education but the economies 
of scope and, therefore, joint production advantages rest with public colleges and 
universities.  Also, there is evidence that the post recessionary pace of higher education 
cost increases have slowed down but the permanency of that is questionable.  
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Publicly vs. Privately Controlled Higher Education Costs: Panel Data Estimates 
 
1. Introduction 
   
Higher education reform that is taking a firm hold in both Europe and the U.S. continues 
to bring into question the cost structure of higher education and, in particular, the extent 
to which state owned, publicly controlled colleges and universities differ from their non-
profit privately controlled counterparts.  On this front, empirical evidence produced to 
date has relied on cross-section estimates of cost functions and the associated scale 
and scope economies.  Those cross section results are potentially biased due to 
omitted, unobservable individual college and university effects and/or time effects.  In 
addition, the most comparable studies rely on U.S. college and university data drawn 
from the 1995-96 academic year or earlier and, therefore, are not likely to reflect current 
higher education costs or structural differences between the public and private sectors. 
 
To this line of inquiry, the present paper attempts to offer two major advances.  First, 
instead of cross-sectional data, panel data are employed in estimating a two-way fixed 
effects multiproduct cost function and the resulting scale and scope economies.  
Second, the panel covers four years of higher education costs, including the years from 
2005-06 through 2008-09.  The latter is the most recent release of national data and, 
combined with other years allows for the control of business cycle effects, including 
possible effects of the financial meltdown induced recession on higher education costs. 
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2. Literature background 
 
Research related to higher education has clearly recognized the multiproduct nature of 
colleges and universities and the replacement of unidimensional measures of 
economies of scale with product specific economies and economies of scope.  The 
multiproduct lines of colleges and universities have included the usual undergraduate 
education, graduate education, and research outputs.  While product specific 
economies or diseconomies relate to increases in a single output holding all others 
constant, measures of scope economies determine whether it is cheaper to have 
colleges and universities produce two or more products jointly or to have separate 
production in specialized colleges and universities.   
 
The first multiproduct empirical investigation of higher education scale and scope 
economies was provided by Cohn, et al. (1989).  Using a cross sectional sample of U.S. 
institutions for the 1981-82 year, they found product-specific cost advantages only in the 
public sector and only with regard to research and graduate education.  Economies of 
scope in undergraduate and graduate education and research were uncovered in both 
public and private institutions. 
 
Subsequent studies produced some conflicting as well as supporting evidence. All 
employed cross-sectional data.  The most comparable research includes the use of 
U.S. data for the academic years 1982-83 (DeGroot et al., 1991), 1990-91 (Koshal and 
Koshal, 1999), and 1995-96 (Laband and Lentz, 2003 and Sav, 2004).  The DeGroot et 
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al. (1991) study examined only research level universities but found general agreement 
with the Cohn et al. (1989) findings.  In constrast, Koshal and Koshal (1999) excluded 
Ph.D. granting universities and reported economies of scope in both public and private 
sectors.  Laband and Lentz (2003) repeat the work of Cohn et al. but provide an update 
using 1995-96 data.  They found  product-specific economies in both sectors, but 
diseconomies of scope in each. 
 
Detailed comparisons across these studies are difficult at best.  Each uses different cost 
specifications, different variables, and different survey data.  However, all of them bring 
into question the potential omitted variable bias created from single year cross sectional 
estimates.  Additionally, given the reforms on higher education agendas, there arises 
the obvious need for a more contemporary examination of education cost structures. 
 
3. Empirical methodology 
 
Here, panel data is used in an extension of the multiproduct cost methodology 
developed by Baumol et al. (1982) and employed in previous higher education 
research.  Introducing individual college and university institutional effects  i  and 
controlling for time effects  t , the total cost Cit of producing all Q j  outputs is specified 
as a two-way fixed effects multiproduct cost function as follows: 
C Q Q Qit jj
J
jit jk jit kit
kj
i t it         1 2/     (1) 
where  it  is the standard, purely random effect.   
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In the usual three output case, the outputs Q j  vary according to the production of 
research and undergraduate and graduate teaching.  However, unlike previous studies, 
here a professional school (e.g., law and medical) teaching output will be added to 
account for its potentially high cost effects.  Thus, (1) is expanded from a three to a four 
output cost function.  Two additional quality type variables are appended to (1).  On the 
input side, the percentage of students receiving low income federal government 
subsidies is used to proxy students potentially arriving from underfunded school 
districts.  As a measure of quality instruction, the percentage of students that are 
graduated with a bachelor’s degree within five years of enrollment is employed.  Also, 
the ratio of institutional liabilities to assets is included as a possible measure of the 
effects of managerial quality on fiscal costs. 
 
Multiproduct production gives rise to three measures of cost efficiency: ray economies 
of scale, product specific economies of scale and economies of scope.  From the cost 
function (1), the three economies are: 
Ray=C C QJ j jj 
'd i      >1 for economies (2) 
Product Specific= C C C QJ J j j j  d i d i'  >1 for economics (3) 
Scope= C C C Cj J j J J  d i   >0 for economies (4) 
where CJ is the total cost of producing all J outputs, C j the total cost of only the j th 
output, and C j
'
 the marginal cost of the j th output.  From a policy perspective, ray 
economies suggest cost advantages of expanding all university education and research.  
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In higher education that is an unlikely scenario: e.g., increases in undergraduate 
education would not carry the same increases in research or professional school output.   
Thus, the appropriate focus will be on product specific economies whereby the cost 
effect is on increasing output for a product line.  Diseconomies of scale generated from 
values less than unity would thereby suggest product specific downsizing.   Joint 
production cost advantages require positive values of the economies of scope measure.  
Negative values would lead to possible arguments for higher education systems 
comprised of more specialized colleges and universities.  
 
4. Data 
 
Data is supplied through the U.S. Department of Education, Integrated Postsecondary 
Education Data System (IPEDS).  Frequent changes in the accounting requirements 
imposed upon individual colleges and universities tends to compromise the continuity of 
some longitudinal data.  In the present study, continuity is preserved with the most 
recently available data for the four fiscal years 2005-06 through 2008-09.  The sample 
excludes institutions outside of the current mainstream of post-secondary education 
interest; e.g., chiropractic and culinary institutes.  The total panels are comprised of 
2116 and 3628 observations for the public and private sectors, respectively. 
 
Table 1 summarizes the variable definitions along with their means and standard 
deviations.  All costs are twelve month 2009 real dollars.  Undergraduate and graduate 
outputs are credit hours.  Due to data availability, professional school education is 
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unduplicated enrollments.  As with previous studies, it was necessary to rely on 
research grants received as the best proxy for institutionally aggregated research. 
 
5. Results 
 
Table 2 presents the total cost two-way fixed effects regression results for both the 
public and private sectors.  The reported R-squares are reasonably strong.  For each 
sector, individual college and university effects ( i ) are significant at the one percent 
level: the null hypothesis that all  i =0 is rejected.  Pooling across individual colleges 
and universities and employing OLS would generate biased cost estimates.  In addition, 
the joint test that all time effects ( t ) are zero is rejected.  Thus, there is compelling 
support for the two-way fixed effects implementation.  Moreover, a Breusch-Pagan test 
for each sector suggested appropriateness of random effects only at the thirty-four 
percent level of significance.  Finally, a Chow test (28.38 significant at 1%) confirmed 
systematic inter-sector structural differences in costs. 
     
For the cost factors, the majority of variables within both sectors are statistically sound 
at either the one, five or ten percent level of significance.  The positive and significant 
individual time effects indicate increasing higher education costs for each year and in 
each sector.  However, the most recent rate of increase is substantially slowed, e.g., 
from 2008 to 2009 compared to 2007 to 2008.  While undergraduate (UGRAD) and 
professional (PRO) education outputs along with research (RES) prove to be 
statistically significant, graduate education (GRAD) falls below the 10% mark.  However, 
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as with previous studies, the nonlinearity of cost structures pose interpretation 
difficulties in relying on individual coefficients.  Thus, Table 3 provides marginal cost 
estimates at the mean outputs and confirms that the cost increment of an additional 
credit hour of undergraduate and graduate education is lower at public compared to 
private institutions.   But the differential is not balanced: the undergraduate marginal 
cost is 9% of the private sector’s while the graduate marginal cost is 40%.  The marginal 
research cost advantage also resides with public institutions. However, an additional 
professional school enrollee is 40% less costly to educate in private compared to public 
colleges and universities.     
 
Interestingly, the percent of federally funded lower income students has a smaller 
negative cost effect in the public compared to the private sector but only carries 
statistical significance in the former.  And although not statistically significant, it is 
reassuring that the negative DEGREE sign suggests it could be cheaper to get students 
degreed in a more timely fashion that not.  But if DEBT carries any managerial 
implications, then its cost increasing effect in both sectors could remain a long term cost 
issue for higher education. 
 
Table 4 presents the economies of scale and scope results for each of the outputs.  
Results are provided for the overall mean of each output and for the mean outputs for 
2009.  Taking into account the fixed institutional effects, the estimates are generated at 
the median, minimum, and maximum institutional effects.  As noted earlier, there is little 
interest in ray economies and, therefore, they are not included in the analysis of Table 
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4.  However, at the overall means, it can be noted that ray economies were found in 
both the public and private sectors at values of 1.62 and 1.89, respectively.  As for 
product specific economies, at the median evaluation only private colleges and 
universities producing in 2009 realize any reasonable cost advantages and that occurs 
in graduate and professional education outputs.  At least half of the private institutions 
realize those scale economies.  But the findings also unveil substantial variability 
around the median institution.  That variability is almost universally larger among public 
compared to private colleges and universities.  At the upper end of the range, the 
private sector shows strong product specific economies for all teaching outputs whereas 
the public sector has a much weaker showing on all accounts.  Moreover, the public 
sector diseconomies tend to worsen in 2009 while the private sector shows some 
positive gains.  However, in both sectors, the variability narrows and, therefore, there 
seems to be a tendency over time toward more homogeneity in cost structures within a 
given sector. 
 
With respect to scope economies, quite a different picture emerges.  When evaluated at 
the overall means, scope economies prevail at the median in both sectors and for all 
three teaching outputs and research.  In 2009, that remains true for public colleges and 
universities and, in fact, becomes stronger.  The same does not hold for the private 
sector.  For the 2009 median, the scope economies degenerate into diseconomies for 
all outputs.  But unlike the product specific economies, the tendency for the scope 
economies to narrow in variability is not as convincing in either sector.  
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6. Concluding remarks 
 
This paper indicates that there is significant individual college and university fixed 
effects as well as time effects present in the underlying cost structures of public and 
private colleges and universities.  Hence, previous cross sectional cost estimates and 
corresponding investigations of economies of scale and scope could have generated 
statistically biased results.  Presently, empirical implementation of a two-way fixed cost, 
four output model indicates that public colleges and universities have generally 
exhausted product specific economies of scale in producing undergraduate, graduate, 
and professional education and research.  Private institutions, on the other hand, 
appear to have cost advantages in expanding both graduate and professional school 
education.  Yet, estimates of economies of scope give the cost advantage to the public 
sector, indicating from a public policy perspective that private institutions might consider 
moving to more specialized production whereas public colleges and universities realize 
lower costs of jointly producing under one roof all levels of education along with 
research.  Incorporating fixed institutional effects, however, suggests caution in drawing 
industry wide conclusions.  The results here indicate there exists substantial institutional 
variability.  In addition, the time effects indicate a slowing down in the pace of cost 
increases occurring among both public and private colleges and universities.  At this 
time it is not possible to determine the extent to which those cost changes are driven by 
budgetary problems encountered with the financial meltdown and the accompanying 
recession or by the implementation of widespread higher education reforms.  Those 
answers will have to await future research as more years of data become available.    
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Table 1:  Variables, Means and Standard Deviations 
 
Variable Public Private 
C, Total Cost, $ 2.80E+08 
(4.71E+08) 
1.24E+08 
(3.88E+08) 
UGRAD, Undergraduate Credit Hours  2.79E+05 
(2.45E+05) 
0.71E+05 
(0.85E+05) 
GRAD, Graduate Credit Hours  3.96E+04 
(5.55E+04) 
1.77E+04 
(4.17E+04) 
PRO, Professional Enrollments 2.05E+02 
(5.66E+02) 
1.44E+02 
(4.46E+02) 
RES, Research, $ 5.21E+07 
(11.26E+07) 
1.59E+07 
(8.01E+07) 
UGRAD2, UGRAD Squared 1.38E+11 
(2.77E+11) 
0.12E+11 
(04.81E+11) 
GRAD2, GRAD Squared 4.65E+09 
(17.02E+09) 
2.05E+09 
(12.16E+09) 
PRO2, PRO Squared 3.62E+05 
(17.22E+05) 
2.20E+05 
(10.25E+05) 
RES2, RES Squared 1.52E+16 
(7.22E+16) 
0.67E+16 
(6.03E+16) 
UGRAD-GRAD, Undergraduate x Graduate 2.19E+10 
(5.98E+10) 
0.3.5E+10 
(1.53E+10) 
UGRAD-RES, Undergraduate x Research 3.13E+13 
(10.67E+13) 
0.38E+13 
(2.26E+13) 
GRAD-RES, Graduate x Research 7.02E+12 
(29.27E+12) 
2.49E+12 
(20.25E+12) 
PRO-RES, Professional x Research 6.08E+10 
(29.20E+10) 
1.93E+10 
(12.94E+10) 
WG, Faculty Average Wage, $ 6.39E+04 
(1.34E+04) 
5.87E+04 
(1.83E+04) 
WG2, WG Squared 4.26E+09 
(1.76E+09) 
3.78E+09 
(2.53E+09) 
UGRAD-WG, Undergraduate x Wage 1.95E+10 
(2.02E+10) 
0.49E+10 
(0.77E+10) 
GRAD-WG, Graduate x Wage 2.94E+09 
(4.79E+09) 
1.40E+09 
(4.08E+09) 
PRO-WG, Professional x Wage 1.63E+07 
(4.77E+07) 
1.22E+07 
(4.14E+07) 
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Table 1:  (continued)  Variable                                              Public                Private 
 
RES-WG, Research x Wage 
 
4.08E+12 
(9.91E+12) 
1.60E+12 
(8.99E+12) 
FED, Percent Students on Federal Grants 32.21 
(16.37) 
31.43 
(19.26) 
DEGREE, Percent Students Degreed in 6 Years 42.89 
(17.66) 
56.33 
(19.84) 
UGRAD-DEGREE, Undergraduate x Degree  1.40E+07 
(1.65E+07) 
0.45E+07 
(0.65E+07) 
FED-DEGREE, Undergraduate x FED 1.26E+03 
(0.55E+03) 
1.57E+03 
(0.86E+03) 
DEBT, Liability to Asset 0.38 
(0.22) 
0.34 
(0.17) 
N  2116 3626 
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Table 2:  Public vs Private Total Cost Regression Results 
 
Variable                 Public           Private 
Constant 48.63E+07*** 
(9.20E+07) 
7.85E+07*** 
(1.58E+07) 
UGRAD -7.59E+02*** 
(1.82E+02) 
-1.85E+02* 
(0.9.5E+02) 
GRAD -3.58E+02 
(6.31E+02) 
2.99E+02 
(2.19E+02) 
PRO -17.52E+04* 
(9.41E+04) 
8.49E+04** 
(3.52E+04) 
RES 2.04E-01* 
(1.21E-01) 
5.04E-01** 
(2.47E-01) 
UGRAD2 1.02E-04 
(0.83E-04) 
-2.04E-04 
(1.32E-04) 
GRAD2 -1.93E-03* 
(1.13E-03) 
-7.10E-03*** 
(0.64E-03) 
PRO2 3.56E+01 
(2.72E+01) 
-6.25E+01*** 
(1.48E+01) 
RES2 2.59E-09*** 
(3.74E-10) 
-2.25E-09*** 
(1.40E-10) 
UGRAD-GRAD 1.50E-03*** 
(4.62E-04) 
1.71E-03*** 
(4.33E-04) 
UGRAD-RES -6.86E-07** 
(3.39E-07) 
-38.03E-07*** 
(3.72E-07) 
GRAD-RES -1.15E-06* 
(6.83E-07) 
6.84E-06*** 
(4.51E-07) 
PRO-RES -6.30E-04*** 
(8.80E-05) 
14.60E-04*** 
(8.64E-05) 
WG -8.67E+03*** 
(22.70E+02) 
-1.13E+03*** 
(2.45E+02) 
WG2 2.84E-02* 
(15.1E-03) 
0.78E-02*** 
(2.14E-03) 
UGRAD-WG 8.22E-03 
(1.56E-03) 
6.92E-03*** 
(1.10E-03) 
GRAD-WG 6.69E-03 
(9.07E-03) 
6.73E-03*** 
(2.41E-03) 
PRO-WG 52.76E-01*** 
(6.98E-01) 
-5.47E-01** 
(2.47E-01) 
RES-WG 1.17E-05 
(0.40E-05) 
2.83E-05*** 
(0.12E-05) 
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Table 2:  (continued)   Variable                 Public                      Private                 
 
FED 
 
-0.38E+05*** 
(4.26E+05) 
-1.33E+05 
(1.00E+05) 
DEGREE -1.61E+05 
(4.96E+05) 
-1.62E+05 
(1.01E+05) 
UGRAD-DEGREE 3.93E+00*** 
(1.38E+00) 
0.12E+00 
(0.69E+00) 
FED-DEGREE -5.35E+03 
(10.42E+03) 
3.57E+03** 
(1.79E+03) 
DEBT 2.71E+07* 
(1.59E+07) 
1.49E+07* 
(0.82E+07) 
2007 2.07E+07*** 
(0.42E+07) 
0.36E+07*** 
(0.11E+07) 
2008 
5.28E+07*** 
(0.65E+07) *** 
0.63E+07*** 
(0.14E+07) 
2009 6.06E+07*** 
(0.74E+07) 
0.90E+07*** 
(0.15E+07) 
F 99.96*** 396.18*** 
R2 (within/between/overall) 0.63/0.84/0.83 0.79/0.88/0.88 
All  i =0 (rejected) 32.37*** 87.59*** 
All  t =0  (rejected)                                                                                                                                                                                             24.76*** 10.76*** 
N  2116 3626 
Note: Significant at the 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% level (***) or better, two-tailed. 
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Table 3:  Intersector Marginal Cost Estimates ($) 
 
 Undergraduate Graduate Professional Research 
Public  15.24 275.44 413,349.89 0.86 
Private 169.36 673.176 58,041.83 2.16 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4:  Product Specific and Scope Minimums, Medians and Maximums 
 
 Public Private 
 Min Median Max  Min Median Max  
Product Economies at the overall means 
Undergraduate -4.171 0.478 2.931  -1.096 0.392 1.222  
Graduate -1.542 0.268 1.224  -1.092 0.483 1.236  
Professional -0.569 0.135 0.457  -1.564 0.626 1.757  
Research -0.421 0.211 0.255  -0.378 0.185 0.434  
Scope Economies at the overall means 
Undergraduate -0.698 0.452 1.454  -0.227 0.136 0.220  
Graduate -0.656 0.888 1.498  -0.238 0.252 0.227  
Professional -0.591 1.534 1.563  -0.223 0.467 0.224  
Research -0.058 1.683 1.578  -0.226 0.225 0.221  
Product Economies at the 2009 means  
Undergraduate -1.274 0.139 0.886  0.036 0.936 1.063  
Graduate -1.351 0.222 1.053  0.462 1.063 1.121  
Professional -0.511 0.087 0.404  0.642 1.593 1.770  
Research -0.409 0.161 0.241  0.179 0.386 0.388  
Scope Economies at the 2009 means  
Undergraduate -0.613 0.615 1.338  -0.203 -0.098 0.156  
Graduate -0.571 1.041 1.381  -0.202 -0.868 0.273  
Professional -0.510 1.641 1.441  -0.200 -0.671 0.471  
Research -0.496 1.783 1.455  -0.202 -0.904 0.237  
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